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54 DIGIORGIO FRUIT CORP. 1). DEPT. OF EMPLOYlIENT [56 C.2d 
[Sac. No. 7279. In Bank. May 29, 1961.] 
DI GIORGIO FRUIT CORPORATION (a Corporation), 
Respondent, v. DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT 
OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA et a1., Defendants 
and Appellants. 
[Sac. No. 7283. In Bank. May 29, 1961.] 
THOMAS C. BOWERS, Respondent, v. DEPARTMENT 
OF EMPLOYMENT OF THE STATE OF CALIFOR-
NIA et at, Defendants and Appellants; AGRICUL-
TURAL WORKERS ORGANIZING COMMITTEE, 
AFL-CIO (an Unincorporated Association), Intervener 
and Appellant; ARTHUR J. GOLDBERG, as Secretary 
of Labor, United States Department of Labor, Movant 
and Appellant. 
[1] Labor-Public Employment Service.-The Wagner-Peyser Act 
(48 Stat. 113 (1933) as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 49-49n (1956», 
which has been accepted by this state (Unemp. Ins. Code, 
§§ 2051,2052), governs the operation of the state employment 
service. 
[2] Appeal-Dismissal-Settlement of Controversy.-The appeal 
of a petitioner for intervention will be dismissed where, in 
view of the fact that the question of law involved has been 
decided, no purpose would be served by determining whether 
the trial court erred in denying him leave to intervene. 
[S] Labor-Remedies-Appeal-Moot Questions.-In proceedings 
in mandamus to compel the State Department of -Employment 
to refer agricultural workers to petitioners' fruit ranches dur-
ing a certain harvest season because a strike was in progress, 
appeals from judgments directing that a writ of mandate 
issue in each case, following a determination by the trial court 
that a regulation of the United States Secretary of Labor 
forbidding referrals in labor dispute situations was invalid, 
should not be dismissed as moot, though the harvest season was 
over, where the appeals presented a question of continuing 
importance in the administration of the employment service, 
the very shortness of harvest season would preclude appellate 
review in mandate proceedings if the end of each season were 
treated as rendering the appeals moot, and tIle public interest 
[1] See Ca1.Jur.2d, Labor, § 40 et seq. 
McX. Dig. References: [1,4-9] Labor, § 2.6; [2] Appeal and 
Error, § 913; [3] Labor, § 30.5. 
) 
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[4] 
[5] 
[6] 
[7] 
[8] 
compelled a present determination of the validity of the Secre-
tary's regulation. 
ld.-Public Employment Service.-Under the Wagner-Peyser 
Act, creating the United States Employment Service to pro-
mote the establishment and maintenance of a national system of 
public employment offices, it is the duty of the Employment 
Service to assist in establishing and maintaining systems of 
public employment offices in the several states and to assist in 
coordinating such offices throughout the United States. 
ld.-Public Employment Service-Referrals.-The operation of 
an efficient employment service requires the formulation of rea-
sonable referral standards so that prospective employees may 
be referred to jobs for which they are suited and which are 
suitable to them, and under the Wagner-Peyser Act, it is for 
the United States Secretary of Labor to provide such stan-
dards. In doing so, he does not regulate the conditions of 
employment or determine the qualifications of employees, but 
he necessarily determines the conditions on which employers 
or employees may receive the benefits of the publicly-supported 
employment service. 
ld.-Public Employment Service-Referrals.-Although the 
United States Secretary of Labor may not, in his regulations 
governing public employment offices, prevent an employer from 
hiring an employee unsuited to a job, he may provide that no 
referral shall be made in such case. Similarly, although he 
may not regulate working conditions or wages, he may pro-
vide that no referrals shall be made to employers who maintain 
unsafe or unsanitary places of employment or pay substandard 
wages. 
ld. - Public Employment Service - Referrals.-The United 
State Secretary of Labor might determine to withhold the serv-
ices of public employment offices in cases of strikes or lockouts 
and leave it to employers to secure employees through other 
channels, he might determine to continue referrals and leave 
it to the individual employees to decide whether to accept or 
reject jobs where a labor dispute existed, or he might adopt 
some intermediate position. 
ld.-Public Employment Service-Referrals.-By authorizing 
and directing the United States Secretary of Labor "to pro-
vide for the giving of notice of strikes or lockouts to applicants 
before they are referred to employment" (29 U.S.C. § l1(b», 
Congress did not define the full extent of the Secretary's rule-
making power with respect to referrals in the event of labor 
disputes. Such statutory provision does not provide that the 
Secretary must authorize referrals when there are strikes or 
lockouts; it provides only that notice must be given before 
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referrals are made, and only to this extent does it restrict the 
rule-making power granted by § 12. 
[9] ld.-Public Employment Service-Referrals.-In view of the 
fact that the United States Secretary of Labor and his prede-
cessors have consistently interpreted the Wagner-Peyser Act as 
authorizing regulations with respect to referrals in the event 
of labor disputes in addition to the minimum notice require-
ment of § l1(b), and such regulations have been in effect for 
many years, consistent administrative construction of the 
statute, particularly where it originated with those charged 
with putting the statutory machinery into effect, is entitled to 
great weight and will not be overturned unless clearly errone-
ous. 
APPEALS from judgments of the Superior Courts of Yuba 
County and Butte County and from an order of the Superior 
Court of Butte County denying a petition for leave to inter-
vene. Warren Steel and A. B. Ware, -Judges. Judgments 
reversed; appeal from order dismissed; motion by respondent 
in Sac. No. 7279 to dismiss appeal, denied. 
Proceedings in mandamus to compel the Department of 
Employment, its director and employees to refer agricultural 
workers to petitioners' fruit ranches while a strike was in 
progress during the 1960 harvest season. Judgments granting 
writs, reversed. 
Stanley Mosk, Attorney General, B. Abbott Goldberg and 
Charles A. Barrett, Assistant Attorneys General, Walter J. 
Wiesner, Deputy Attorney General, and Maurice P. McCaf-
fery, Chief Counsel, Department of Employment, for Defend-
ants and Appellants. 
Simonelli and Fransen and Nels B. Fransen for Intervener 
and Appellant. 
Laurence E. Dayton, United States Attorney, Charles Elmer 
Collett, Assistant United States Attorney, Kenneth C. Robert-
son, Regional Attorney, and Altero D'Agostini, Attorney, 
United States Department of Labor, for Movant and Appel-
lant. 
Laurence E. Dayton, United States Attorney, Charles 
Elmer Collett, Assistant United States Attorney, Kenneth C. 
Robertson, Regional Attorney, and Altero D'Agostini, Attor-
ney, United States Department of Labor, as Amici Curiae on 
behalf of Defendants and Appellants in No. 7279. 
• A8signed by Chairman of Judicial Council. 
) 
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Marion B. Plant, Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison, Rich, 
Fuidge, Dawson & Marsh, Rich, Fuidge & Dawson, Mc-
Cutchen, Doyle, Brown & Enersen, Raymond A. Leonard, 
Hewitt & McBride and Loyd W. McCormick for Respondents. 
Charles A. Rummell, Gerald H. Trautman and Gerald D. 
Marcus as Amici Curiae on behalf of Respondent in No. 7283. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Petitioners, Di Giorgio Fruit Corporation 
and Thomas C. Bowers, brought separate actions for writs 
of mandate to compel respondents, the Department of Em-
ployment of the State of California and its director and 
employees, to refer agricultural workers to petitioners' fruit 
ranches during the harvest season in 1960. A strike called 
by the Agricultural Workers Organizing Committee, AFL-
CIO, was in progress at each ranch. Pursuant to a regulation 
of the United States Secretary of Labor1 issued under the 
Wagner-Peyser Act (48 Stat. 113 (1933) as amended, 29 
U.S.C.A. §§ 49-49n (1956» the department refused to refer 
workers to petitioners for employment. [1] The Wagner-
Peyser Act, which has been accepted by this state (Unemp. 
Ins. Code, §§ 2051, 2052), governs the operation of the state 
employment service. In the Bowers case the trial court per-
mitted the organizing committee to intervene on the side of 
the department. It refused, however, to permit the Secretary 
of Labor to intervene in support of his regulation. In each 
case the trial court concluded that the regulation was invalid 
and entered judgment directing that a writ of mandate issue. 
The department and the individual respondents have appealed 
from the judgment in each case, and the organizing com-
mittee has appealed from the judgment in the Bowers case. 
The Secretary of Labor has appealed from the order denying 
his petition for leave to intervene in the Bowers case. 
[2] The Secretary of Labor contends that his interest 
in the validity of his regulation is sufficient to support ~nter-
1" Beferro.'b '" ro.bor di8pvte ,it1UltiOfil. No person shall be referred 
to a position the filling of whieh will aid direetly or indirectly in filling 
a job which (1) is vacant because the former occupant is on strike or is 
being locked out in the course of a labor dispute, or (2) the filling of 
which is an issue in a labor dispute. With respeet to positions not cov-
ered by subparagraph (1) or (2) of this paragraph, any individual may 
be referred to a place of employment in which a labor dispute exists, 
provided he is given written notice of such dispute prior to or at the 
time of his referral." (20 C.F.R., ~ 602.2(b) (Supp. 1960). See also 
20 C.F.R., ~ 604.1(1) (Supp.1960).) 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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vention (see C01mty of San BernarcUno v. Harsh Calif. Corp., 
52 Ca1.2d 341, 345-346 [340 P.2d 617]), and that therefore 
the trial court erred in denying leave to intervene. Bowers 
contends that the Secretary's intervention would have delayed 
the action and that the need for a prompt decision in the 
. trial court during the harvest season justified denial of the 
Secretary's petition. The validity of the regulation presents 
only a question of law on which the Secretary has been fully 
heard on these appeals. Since we have now determined that 
question and since any prejudice the Secretary may have 
suffered from not being allowed to be heard in the trial court 
cannot be undone, no purpose would be served by determining 
whether the trial court erred in denying him leave to inter-
vene. Accordingly, his appeal will be dismissed. 
Di Giorgio has moved to dismiss the appeal taken from 
the judgment in its favor on the ground that it is moot. It 
points out that the harvest season is now over and contends 
that the writ of mandate is therefore no longer operative. 
Although there has been no motion in the Bowers case to dis-
miss the appeals, it would follow that they should be dismissed 
if Di Giorgio's motion to dismiss is well-taken. 
[3] We have concluded that the appeals from the judg- ' 
ments should not be dismissed as moot. Even if the writs 
of mandate were operative only during the harvest season of 
1960, the appeals present a question of continuing importance 
in the administration of the employment service. The very 
shortness of harvest seasons would preclude appellate review 
in mandate proceedings if the end of each season were treated 
as rendering the appeals moot. These are not cases in which 
the parties are no longer interested in the legal issue involved 
(see California Prune & Apricot Growers' Assn. v. Pomeroy 
Orchard Co., 195 Cal. 264, 265-266 [232 P. 463]), and Di 
Giorgio's suggestion that the issue could be determined in a 
declaratory relief action demonstrates that there is a con-
tinuing controversy ripe for decision. No purpose but delay 
would be served by dismissing the appeals, and the public 
interest both in the operation of the employment service and 
in the orderly administration of justice compels a deter-
mination now of the validity of the Secretary's regulation. 
(See In re Newbern, 55 Ca1.2d 500, 505 [11 Cal.Rptr. 547, 
360 P.2d 43] ; Almassy v. Los Angeles County Civil Service 
Com., 34 Ca1.2d 387, 390 [210 P.2d 503] ; Kirstowsky v. Su-
perior Court, 143 Cal.App.2d 745, 749 [300 P.2d 163] ; Terry 
v. Civil Service Commission, 108 Cal.App.2d 861, 872 [240 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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P.2d 691] ; Rattray v: Scuddm', 67 Ca1.App.2d 123, 127-128 
[153 P.2d 433].) 
[ 4] The Wagner-Peyser Act, enacted in 1933 (48 Stat . 
. 113), created the United States Employment Service to pro-
mote the establishment and maintenance of a national system 
of public cmployment offices. It is the duty of the Employ-
ment Service to assist in establishing and maintaining systems 
of public employment offices in the several states and to assist 
in coordinating such offices throughout the United States. 
The act provides for grants of federal funds to states that 
wish to receive its benefits by operating their own employ-
ment offices in cooperation with the United States Employ-
ment Service. States wishing to receive such funds must 
submit plans of operation to the Secretary of Labor, and he 
is authorized to certify to the Secretary of the Treasury for 
payment necessary operating funds to each state that has an 
approved unemployment compensation law in compliance with 
the act. Section 9 provides that it shall be the duty of the 
Secretary of Labor to ascertain whether the system of public 
employment offices maintained in each state is conducted in 
accordance with the rules and regulations and the standards 
of efficiency prescribed by him under the act. Section 11 (a) 
provides for the establishment of a "Federal Advisory Coun-
cil composed of men and women representing employers and 
employees in equal numbers and the public for the purpose 
of formulating policies and discussing problems relating to 
employment and insuring impartiality, neutrality, and free-
dom from political influence in the solution of such problems. " 
(29 U.S.C.A. § 49j(a) (1956).) It also provides for the es-
tablishment of similar state advisory councils. Section 11 (b) 
provides that "In carrying out the provision of" the act 
"the Secretary is authorized and directed to provide for the 
giving of notice of strikes or lockouts to applicants before 
they are referred to employment" (29 U.S.C.A. § 49j(b) 
(1956) ), and section 12 provides that" The Secretary of Labor 
is authorized to make such rules and regulations as may be 
necessary to carry out the provisions of" the act. (29 U.S.C.A. 
§ 49k (1956).) Pursuant to this authority the Secretary 
adopted the regulation challenged in these cases providing 
that "No person shall be referred to a position the filling 
of which will aid directly or indirectly in filling a job which 
(1) is vacant because the former occupant is on strike or is 
being locked out in the course of a labor dispute, or (2) the 
) 
) 
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filling of which is an issue in a labor dispute." (20 C.F.R. 
§ 602.2 (b) (Supp. 1960).) 
. [5] The operation of an efficient employment service 
obviously requires the formulation of reasonable referral 
standards so that prospective employees may be referred to 
jobs for which they are suited and which are suitable to them. 
Under section 12 it is for the Secretary to provide such stand-
ards. In doing so, he does not regulate the conditions of 
employment or determine the qualifications of employees, but 
he necassarily determines the conditions on which employers or 
employees may receive the benefits of the publiely-supported 
employment service. [ 6 ] Thus, although he may not pre-
vent an employer from hiring an employee unsuited to a job, 
he may provide that no referral shall be made in such a case. 
Similarly, although he may not regulate working conditions 
or wages, he may provide that no referrals shall be made to 
employers who maintain unsafe or unsanitary places of em-
ployment or pay substandard wages. (See 41 Ops. U.S. Atty. 
Gen. No. 74 (1959).) Section 12 likewise authorizes the Sec-
retary to determine how the policy of neutrality stated in 
section l1(a) can best be served. ['1] He might determine 
to withhold the services of the public employment offices in 
eases of strikes or lockouts and leave it to employers to secure 
employees through other channels, he might determine to 
continue referrals and leave it to the individual employees to 
decide whether to aecept or reject jobs where a labor dispute 
existed, or he might adopt some intermediate position. (SE"e 
Virginia Electric etc. Co. v. National Labor Relations Board. 
319 U.S. 533, 539-540 [63 8.Ct. 1214, 87 L.Ed. 1568] ; Fahey 
v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245, 249-250 [67 S.Ct. 1552, 91 L.Ed. 
2030]; Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 542-543 [72 S.Ct. 
525, 96 L.Ed. 547] ; American P. ct L. Co. v. Securities <f 
E. Com., 329 U.S. 90, 104-105, 112 [67 S.Ct. 133, 91 L.Ed. 
103] ; American TruckiflfJ Assns. v. Uflited States, 344 U.S. 
298,310-311 [73 S.Ct. 307, 97 L.Ed. 337] ; 1 Davis, Adminis-
trative Law Treatise, § 5.03, p. 302.) 
[8] Petitioners contend, however, that by authorizing 
and directing the Secretary "to provide for the giving of 
notice of strikes or lockouts to applicants before they are 
referred to employment" (§ n(b» Congress defined the full 
extent of the Secretary's rule-making power with respect 
to referrals in the event of labor disputes. We cannot agree 
with this contention. Section 11 (b) does not provide that the 
Secretary must authorize referrals when there are strikes 
) 
) 
) 
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or lockouts. It provides only that notice must be given before 
referrals are made, and only to this extent does it restrict 
the rule-making power granted by section 12. (See American 
Trucking Assns. v. United States, 344 U.S. 298, 316 [73 S.Ct. 
307, 97 L.Ed. 337]; National Broa.dcasti'tlg Co. v. United 
States, 319 U.S. 190, 222-223 [63 S.Ct. 997, 87 L.Ed. 1344] ; 
Spri1lgerv. Philippine Islands, 277 V.S. 189, 206-207 [48 
RCt. 480,72 L.Ed. 845] ; Ne'uberger v. Commissioner, 311 U.S. 
83,88 [61 RCt. 97, 85 L.Ed. 58].) [9] The Secretary and 
his predecessors have consistently interpreted the act as au-
thorizing regulations with respect to referrals in the event 
of labor disputes in addition to the minimum notice require-
ment of section 11 (b). The challenged regulation or regula-
tions similar to it have been in effect since 1939 (see 4 Fed. 
Reg. 2464 (1939));2 even as early as 1934 a regulation was 
adopted substantially restricting the referral services that 
would be provided by employment offices in the event of 
strikes or lockouts. (United States Department of Labor, 
United States Employment Service, Bulletin Number 2, Pro-
cedure for Giving Effect to the provisions of the Wagner-
Peyser Act regarding Strikes or Lockouts, September 15, 
1934;8 see also Sanders v. United States, 60 F.Supp. 483, 
491.) Consistent administrative construction of a statute over 
many years, particularly when it originated with those 
charged with putting the statutory machinery into effect, is 
·"Sec. 21.12. Referrals in Labor Disputes. Unless otherwise provided 
by State law, the State Service shall require that eaeh employment offiee 
under its supervision refrain from referring any person to any position 
at any place of employment where there exists a labor dispute. For the 
purpose of this rule, the term 'labor dispute' shall inelude any contro· 
versy eoncerning terms or eonditions of employment or concerning the 
Bssoeiation or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintain· 
ing, ehanging, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment 
regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate 
relation of employer and employee." 
"This regulation provided in part: 
"An opening involving a strike or lockout may be brought to the 
attention of any applicant who calls voluntarily in person at an offiee 
of a State employment service or of the National Reemployment Servo 
ice. 
"Applicants previ01ls1y registered at an employment office shall not be 
requested by mail, telephone, telegraph, or other means of notification to 
call at the employment office for an interview eoncerning a position in· 
volt'ing a strike or lockout. 
"An applicant shall not, under any cireumstanees, be referred to a 
position involving a strike or lockout until he has been notified verbally 
and in writing of the existence and nature of t.he dispute. The applicant 
shall be required to sign acknowledgment of the written notification 
before be is referred." (Italics added.) 
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entitled to great weight and will not be overturned unless 
clearly erroneous. (Federal Trade Com. v. Mandel Brothers, 
359 U.S. 385, 391 [79 S.Ct. 818, 3 L.Ed.2d 893]; Uflited 
States v. American Truckiflg Assfls., 310 U.S. 534, 549 [60 
S.Ct. 1059, 84 L.Ed. 1345] ; United States v. Leslie Salt Co., 
350 U.S. 383, 396 [76 S.Ct. 416, 100 L.Ed. 441]; Great 
Northern By. Co. v. United States, 315 U.S. 262, 275-276 [62 
S.Ct. 529, 86 L.Ed. 836] ; Norwegian Nitrogefl Co. v. United 
States, 288 U.S. 294, 315 [53 S.Ct. 350, 77 L.Ed. 796] ; Mazer 
v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 213 [74 S.Ct. 460, 98 L.Ed. 630] ; see 
1 Davis, Administrative Law Treatise, § 5.06, p. 324.) We 
cannot say that the Secretary or his predecessors erred in de-
termining the scope of their rule-making power under the act 
or that the regulation challenged by petitioners is invalid. 
(See Ottinger v. Uflited States, 123 Ct. Cl. 23, 45-46, 106 F. 
Supp. 198, 202-203; 41 Ops. U.S. Atty. Gen. No. 74 (1959).) 
The appeal from the order denying leave to intervene is 
dismissed. The motion to dismiss the appeal from the judg-
ment in the Di Giorgio case is denied. The judgments are 
reversed. Each party shall bear its own costs on the appeal 
from the order denying leave to intervene. Appellants shall 
recover their costs on the appeals from the judgments. 
Gibson, C. J., Peters, J., White, J., and Dooling, J., con-
curred. 
McCOMB, J.-I dissent. I would dismiss the appeals, as 
the issues which were before the trial court are now moot. 
Schauer, J., concurred. 
The petition of respondent Thomas C. Bowers for a re-
hearing was denied June 21, 1961. Schauer, J., and Mc-
Comb, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be 
granted. 
